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Abstract 
Using a large sample of U.S. firms during 1987–2011, we find robust evidence that the issuance of 
seasoned equity is associated with abnormally high future stock price crash risk. The association 
between seasoned equity offerings and crash risk is stronger among offerings that involve the sale of 
secondary shares (existing shares sold by insiders or large blockholders). We also find that recent 
seasoned equity issuers are far less likely to experience sudden positive price jumps relative to firms 
that have not recently issued equity. Our findings of elevated crash risk and diminished jump risk, when 
taken together, are consistent with a heightened propensity for firms to hoard bad news but not good 
news when issuing equity.  
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Understanding and predicting extreme left-tail outcomes (i.e., tail risk) in financial markets has garnered 
significant attention from scholars, market participants, and policymakers, especially since the financial crisis 
of 2008. In the theoretical model of Jin and Myers (2006), bad news hoarding gives rise to firm-specific 
(idiosyncratic) tail risk. Various factors can incentivize managers to delay the disclosure of negative private 
information for extended periods of time (Kothari et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2005). Bad news, however, 
cannot be hoarded indefinitely, as the cost to managers of doing so will eventually become too high (Jin and 
Myers, 2006). When accumulated bad news eventually reaches a threshold level that managers can no 
longer sustain, it tends to come out all at once or very quickly, resulting in a very sudden and extreme drop 
in the stock price, which is empirically identified as an extreme left-tail outlier in the distribution of daily or 
weekly firm-specific returns. Empirical studies of firm-specific crash risk have therefore focused on identifying 
firm characteristics or corporate activities that may facilitate or incentivize bad news hoarding. 
 
In this study, we expand this strand of literature by examining whether firm-specific crashes are more likely 
to occur after seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). The works of Graham and Harvey (2001), Baker and 
Wurgler (2002), and Jenter (2005) suggest that corporate managers have a preference for issuing equity 
when they perceive that the market price of the firm’s stock is high, while the recent literature on crash risk 
argues that bad news hoarding temporarily keeps stock prices higher than they otherwise would be. The 
confluence of arguments from these hitherto disjointed literatures thus implies the potential for a strong 
association between equity issues and bad news hoarding, leading us to hypothesize that recent equity 
issuers should be especially prone to sudden crashes. 
  
Using a large panel of U.S. firms during 1987-2011, we find robust evidence that the issuance of seasoned 
equity is associated with abnormally high one-year-ahead crash risk. As in prior studies of crash risk, we 
define a stock price crash as a weekly firm-specific log-return that is 3.1 or more standard deviations below 
the firm’s average during the year. Firms that have recently complete a seasoned equity offering are 
significantly more likely to experience a stock price crash relative to firms that have not recently completed 
an equity offering, and this finding holds in both simple univariate comparisons and in multivariate models 
that control for known predictors of crash risk identified in prior literature. Our finding that SEOs are 
associated with a statistically and economically significant rise in crash risk is robust to the use of alternative 
measures of crash risk that have been employed in the literature, such as the degree of negative skewness 
in firm-specific weekly returns (Chen et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2011a, 2011b), as we find that returns are 
substantially more left skewed among firms that have recently completed an SEO relative to firms that have 
not.  
 
We further investigate whether the association between SEOs and crash risk is stronger among issuers that 
sell secondary shares versus issuers that sell only primary shares. Primary shares are newly created shares 
that raise new equity capital for the firm, while secondary shares are pre-existing shares sold by insiders 
(e.g., officers and directors) or large blockholders. Given the relative information advantage that insiders and 
large blockholders are likely to possess over other market participants, combined with their personal financial 
incentives to exploit their private information, we hypothesize greater crash risk after SEOs that involve the 
sale of secondary shares. We find evidence that strongly supports this hypothesis. 
 
Our findings are consistent with a contemporaneous association between SEOs and bad news hoarding. 
This interpretation of our results depends on the assumption that managers’ have a strong preference for 
issuing stock at high prices. Graham et al. (2005), Kothari et al. (2009), Aboody and Kasznik (2000), and 
Devos et al. (2015) discuss various factors that may incentivize managers to delay the release of good news 
for extended periods, including reputational concerns, costs of revealing proprietary information to 
competitors, and managers’ desire to maximize the value of their stock option grants. If managers do indeed 
have a strong preference for issuing stock when they perceive that the stock price is high, managerial 
incentives for delaying the release of good news should be significantly diminished prior to SEOs and, 
therefore, stock price jumps (sudden, extreme positive returns) should be especially unlikely after SEOs. We 
find robust empirical support for this prediction. Taken together, our findings that crashes are more likely and 
jumps are less likely after an SEO are consistent with a propensity for managers of issuing firms to hoard 
bad but not good news. It is worth noting that these findings, along with our finding of greater left skewness 
in recent issuers’ idiosyncratic returns, indicate that SEOs are not associated with a heightened likelihood of 
extreme returns, per se, but only with a heightened likelihood of extreme left-tail returns.  
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Our study adds to the growing literature on tail risk in equity markets. The recent literature on firm-specific 
crash risk identifies various firm characteristics and corporate activities that portend the risk of a future crash, 
presumably through their association with bad news hoarding. Our study shines the spotlight on an 
observable corporate action with a robust association with future crash risk, which should help to further 
inform future empirical and theoretical research on bad news hoarding and crash risk. Our findings also shed 
new light on the implications of managers’ preference for issuing stock at high prices. Evidence from the 
capital structure literature, specifically that presented by Graham and Harvey (2001) in their survey of 
corporate CFOs, along with the stylized fact that firms tend to issue new equity after their stock price has 
appreciated (Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Bae et al., 2002 Alti and Sulaeman, 
2012), is consistent with the idea that managers’ perception of the stock price plays an important role in 
equity issuance decisions. However, the implications of this regarding stock return dynamics after equity 
offerings remain disputed and thus unclear. Numerous studies have concluded that equity issuers earn post-
offering returns that are, on average, significantly lower than those of matched firms or those predicted by 
asset pricing models (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995; Lee, 1997; 
Teoh et al., 1998; Bae et al., 2002; Clarke et al., 2004; Jenter, 2005). However, numerous other studies have 
questioned the validity of these findings or argued that recent issuers are less risky with respect to one or 
more priced risk factors omitted from standard pricing models or matching procedures, and thus have lower 
expected returns than implied by standard benchmarks (Fama, 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Brav and 
Gompers, 1997; Brav et al., 2000; Eckbo et al., 2000; Shivakumar, 2000; Carlson et al, 2006; Lyandre et al., 
2008; Li et al., 2009; Bessembinder and Zhang, 2013; Lin and Wu, 2013).  
 
While this literature addresses important and relevant questions, its narrow focus on the first moment of the 
return distribution has left our understanding of post-issue return dynamics somewhat limited. Our study 
offers a completely new yet relevant perspective; rather than focusing on the first moment of post-issue 
returns, we ask whether managers’ preference for issuing stock at high prices has important implications for 
tail risk inherent in post-issue returns. Despite the long history of interest among scholars in the behavior of 
stock prices after equity offerings, this study is the first, to our knowledge, to elucidate the presence of 
significantly elevated tail risk in the returns of recent seasoned equity issuers. Thus, our paper further 
enlightens scholarly literature focused on understanding stock return dynamics after seasoned equity 
offerings and, in particular, sheds new light on the implications of managers’ preference for issuing stock at 
perceived high prices. In addition, given published empirical evidence that tail risk is priced in the cross-
section of expected returns (Boyer et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2012; Conrad et al., 2013), the importance of 
extreme return likelihoods and skewness in option valuation (Corrado and Su, 1996; Bakshi et al., 1997; 
Arnold et al., 2007), and the economically significant effect of stock price crashes on shareholder wealth, we 
expect our findings to be especially useful to various market participants and practitioners interested in 




Our first hypothesis is motivated by two strands of literature. The first is the recent literature on firm-specific 
stock price crashes, which has its origins in the theoretical analysis of Jin and Myers (2006). In Jin and Myers 
(2006), managers possess private, firm-specific information and exercise significant control over how quickly 
or slowly information is disclosed to market participants. The withholding and accumulation of bad news for 
an extended period leads to a crash in the stock price when the accumulated negative information is 
eventually revealed to the market. Based on this line of thought, a growing body of empirical literature focused 
on identifying factors that predict firm-level crashes has emerged, with an explicit emphasis on corporate 
activities or firm characteristics that could be associated with bad news hoarding (or lack thereof). Examples 
include the religiosity of the area where a firm is located (Callen and Fang, 2015), the firm’s approach to 
corporate social responsibility (Kim et al., 2014), stable ownership by institutional investors (Callen and Fang, 
2013, An and Zhang, 2013), executive stock option compensation (Kim et al., 2011b), complex tax shelters 
such as those employed by Enron (Kim et al., 2011a), and opaque financial reporting (Hutton et al., 2009). 
Kothari et al. (2009) discuss certain factors that could incentivize managers to hoard bad news for extended 
periods, such as fear of termination, the desire to meet performance benchmarks that enhance prospects for 
promotion or trigger performance-based compensation, and concerns about future employment or post-
retirement benefits like directorships. In addition, Ball (2009) suggests that managerial empire building and 
the desire to garner the esteem of peers could also incent managers to conceal bad news (Ball, 2009). 
Managers may also withhold bad news in hopes that subsequent positive developments will allow them to 
“bury” the negative news (Kothari et al, 2009), a conjecture which is supported by the survey evidence of 
Graham et al. (2005).  
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The second strand of literature from which we draw includes studies that attempt to shed light on important 
factors that managers consider in the decision to issue equity. Several studies argue that managers prefer 
to issue equity when they believe it to be overvalued or when they perceive that the market price is high 
relative to subjective benchmarks, such as book values or past market values (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and 
Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Jenter 2005; Alti and Sulaeman, 
2012).  In their well-known survey of corporate CFOs, Graham and Harvey (2001) report that two-thirds of 
CFOs agree with the statement that "the amount by which our stock is undervalued or overvalued is an 
important or very important consideration in issuing equity," and nearly as many agree that "if our stock price 
has recently risen, the price at which we can sell is 'high'” (p. 216). Moreover, the overall results of the survey 
indicate that stock prices are regarded by CFOs as more important than nine out of ten factors considered 
in the study, which indeed suggests that managers’ perception of the stock price plays an important role in 
equity issuance decisions.       
 
The confluence of arguments and evidence from the different strands of literature cited above suggests that 
managers seeking to issue new equity should have heightened incentives for bad news hoarding. Moreover, 
managers already engaged in bad news hoarding for reasons other than issuing equity may exploit the 
opportunity to issue new shares while prices remain high, which will reinforce their incentives to continue 
hoarding bad news in order to avoid significant price declines prior to offering completion. Empirically, a 
contemporaneous association between bad news hoarding and equity issues implies a predictive relationship 
between equity offerings and future crash risk, which constitutes our first hypothesis:  
 
H1: Firms that have recently completed an SEO are more likely to experience a stock price crash.  
 
About 40% of SEOs during our sample period include secondary shares. Whereas primary shares represent 
newly created equity, with the proceeds accruing to the firm, secondary shares represent already existing 
shares that are sold by insiders (officers and directors) or large blockholders. Clearly, managers and directors 
of firms engaged in bad news hoarding have heightened incentives to exploit their private information by 
selling personally owned shares. The sale of secondary shares by insiders in an SEO may therefore be a 
stronger indicator of the presence of bad news hoarding and, thus, a stronger signal about future crash risk. 
In cases where the selling shareholder is not an insider, invariably it will be a large blockholder. Prevailing 
theories suggest that blockholders can also be privy to inside information. In the theoretical models of Maug 
(1998), Edmans (2009), and Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), the option to liquidate shareholdings based on 
negative nonpublic information at the expense of uninformed investors actually incentivizes costly information 
acquisition by the blockholder. Thus, the high potential for a relative information advantage among selling 
shareholders of secondary shares, whether they be insiders or blockholders, combined with obvious personal 
financial incentives to exploit their information advantage leads us to test the following hypothesis:   
  
H2: SEOs that involve the sale of secondary shares are associated with greater future crash risk relative to 




Our sample consists of U.S. firms in CRSP and Compustat during fiscal years 1987 to 2011 with public 
common stock (CRSP share codes of 10 or 11). Following Kim et al. (2011a), we include firm-years with non-
negative book equity and book assets and firm-years with at least 26 twenty-six non-missing weekly returns 
in CRSP. We also require that firms have information in Compustat and CRSP necessary for the construction 
of our baseline control variables. Our baseline sample consists of 105,119 firm-years. Throughout our paper, 
any references to “years” denote fiscal years (not calendar years) unless otherwise stated. 
 
We estimate firm-specific weekly returns for each firm-year in the sample with the following five-factor model:  
 
𝑅𝑖,𝜏 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝜏 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝜏+ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝜏 + 𝑢𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝜏 + 𝛾𝑖𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝜏 + 𝑖,𝜏 
 
where, for firm i in week 𝜏, Ri is the weekly stock return of firm i and Rm is the weekly return on the CRSP 
value-weighted index. SMB and HML are the weekly returns on the Small-Minus-Big and High-Minus-Low 
portfolios, respectively, of Fama and French (1993), which capture size and book-to-market effects. UMD is 
the Up-Minus-Down portfolio of Carhart (1997), which captures return momentum effects. INDi is the weekly 
return on a value-weighted index that includes all firms in firm i’s Fama-French industry using the updated 
industry classification scheme of Fama and French (1997) that groups firms into forty-nine industries. We 
define the weekly firm-specific log-return in week 𝜏 as the natural logarithm of one plus the residual from the 
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five-factor model. As in Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim et al. (2011a, 2011b), firm i is defined as having a price 
crash in a given week if the firm-specific log-return is 3.09 or more standard deviations below firm i’s mean 
weekly firms-specific log-return during that fiscal year. Our main dependent variable, CRASH, is a dummy 
variable that equals one if a firm has one or more crashes in the given fiscal year and zero otherwise. Our 
empirical analysis uses information available in year t to predict crash risk in year t+1. Thus, measurement 
of our SEO variables and control variables, described below, begins in the first year of our sample period, 
1987, while measurement of our crash risk variables begins in 1988. 
 
Table 1 reports the frequency of firm-specific crashes for each year and for the aggregate sample. In 
aggregate, 18.5% of firm-years in the sample contain a crash. Table 1 also reports the mean firm-specific 
and raw stock returns during crash weeks by year and for the aggregate sample. During weeks containing a 
crash, the average firm-specific return is -23% and the average raw stock return is -24%. 
 
Table 1: Frequency of Stock Price Crashes and Average Crash Returns 
Fiscal Year Number  
of Firms 
Number of 













1988 3,941 535 13.6% -20.5% -21.6% 
1989 4,148 669 16.1% -21.3% -22.5% 
1990 4,099 852 20.8% -24.1% -26.1% 
1991 4,037 677 16.8% -24.4% -24.8% 
1992 4,013 681 17.0% -25.0% -25.8% 
1993 4,041 595 14.7% -22.3% -23.3% 
1994 4,777 698 14.6% -22.0% -23.2% 
1995 5,013 659 13.1% -21.7% -22.9% 
1996 5,328 744 14.0% -23.2% -24.5% 
1997 5,425 783 14.4% -23.5% -25.0% 
1998 5,509 973 17.7% -25.4% -26.8% 
1999 5,302 840 15.8% -26.6% -27.6% 
2000 5,137 993 19.3% -29.0% -29.3% 
2001 4,838 967 20.0% -26.7% -26.9% 
2002 4,688 1,067 22.8% -26.3% -28.1% 
2003 4,464 854 19.1% -19.9% -20.5% 
2004 4,266 901 21.1% -18.2% -19.4% 
2005 4,064 914 22.5% -18.0% -19.2% 
2006 3,933 905 23.0% -17.4% -18.6% 
2007 3,847 891 23.2% -19.4% -21.9% 
2008 3,766 1,077 28.6% -28.1% -29.6% 
2009 3,611 751 20.8% -26.0% -24.5% 
2010 3,549 685 19.3% -18.2% -18.9% 
2011 3,306 694 21.0% -18.2% -20.2% 
Total 105,119 19,405 18.5% -23.0% -24.0% 
 
This table reports the frequency of stock price crashes by year (fiscal) for firms in our sample. The table also 
reports average firm-specific and raw stock returns during weeks that contain a stock price crash. For 
robustness, we employ an additional crash risk variable originally constructed by Chen et al. (2001) and 
employed by An and Zhang (2013), Callen and Fang (2013, 2015), and Kim et al. (2011a, 2011b). NCSKEW 
equals negative one multiplied by the coefficient of skewness of the firm’s weekly firm-specific log-returns 
during the given fiscal year. The coefficient of skewness equals the ratio of the sample third central moment 
to the sample standard deviation cubed. Larger values of this variable correspond to more negative skewness 
and thus higher crash risk. Table 2 reports sample descriptive statistics for NCSKEWt+1. Since our empirical 
analysis regresses one-year ahead crash risk in year t+1 on explanatory variables measured in year t, we 
use the t+1 subscript for our crash risk variables. The sample mean and median values of NCSKEWt+1 of -
0.178 and -0.174, respectively, indicate that weekly firm-specific log-returns are positively skewed for the 
mean and median firm-year.  
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Sample Firms 
Variable   Mean Standard Deviation 25th Percentile  Median 75th 
Percentile 
   N 
CRASHt+1 0.185 0.388 0.000 0.000 0.000 105,119 
NCSKEWt+1 -0.178 0.822 -0.600 -0.174 0.235 105,119 
SEOt 0.059 0.236 0.000 0.000 0.000 105,119 
SECONDARY_SEOt 0.024 0.153 0.000 0.000 0.000 105,119 
LN_MARKETCAPt 5.412 2.122 3.856 5.288 6.881 105,119 
MARKETCAPt 1,945 5,978 47 198 973 105,119 
MBt 2.840 3.566 1.114 1.762 3.029 105,119 
LEVERAGEt 0.207 0.188 0.036 0.171 0.331 105,119 
ROEt -0.095 0.653 -0.045 0.080 0.144 105,119 
DTURNt 0.002 0.075 -0.018 0.000 0.018 105,119 
NCSKEWt -0.154 0.759 -0.575 -0.168 0.228 105,119 
SIGMAt 0.062 0.038 0.034 0.053 0.080 105,119 
ALPHAt 0.001 0.010 -0.004 0.001 0.006 105,119 
LRETRt 0.394 0.315 0.184 0.313 0.461 80,361 
ACCRUALSt 0.237 0.242 0.086 0.161 0.297 87,289 
STDIt 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 79,515 
        
This table presents summary statistics of variables used in our empirical analysis for a sample of firm-years 
(fiscal) comprised of firms in CRSP and Compustat during fiscal years 1987 to 2011. We use the SDC 
Platinum New Issues database to collect data on public offerings of seasoned common equity marketed in 
the United States. We exclude rights offerings and unit offerings, as well as initial public offerings (IPOs), 
since newly public firms lack sufficient historical data necessary for the construction of most of our control 
variables. During the sample period, a total of 6,698 SEOs were completed by the firms in our sample. 
Proceeds of the average SEO represent 22% of the firm’s pre-offering market value of equity. 2,672 (40%) 
of the 6,698 SEOs in our sample include secondary shares, while the remaining 4,176 (60%) are purely 
primary. Of those that include secondary shares, on average the secondary proceeds represent 
approximately 59% of total offering proceeds.  
 
For the purposes of testing H1, we construct a binary variable, denoted as SEOt, that equals one if the firm 
had at least one public seasoned equity offering in year t and zero otherwise. We note that this variable, 
when equal to one, captures all firms-years that contain at least one SEO, irrespective of whether the firm’s 
SEO(s) involved the sale of secondary shares or not. For the purposes of testing H2, among the firm-years 
that contain an SEO, we identify the subset of firm-years that have at least one SEO that involves the sale 
of secondary shares. We then construct an indicator variable, SECONDARY_SEOt, that takes a value of one 
for these firms-years and zero otherwise.  
 
We report sample descriptive statistics for SEOt and SECONDARY_SEOt in Table 2. The sample mean of 
SEOt (0.059) indicates that 5.9% of firms-years in the sample contain one or more SEOs. The mean of 
SECONDARY_SEOt indicates that 2.4% of firm-years contain an SEO that involves secondary shares. Thus, 
of the firm-years that contain an SEO, roughly 41% (2.4/5.9) is comprised of firm-years in which the 
secondary shares were sold, while the remaining 59% is comprised of firm-years in which the SEO(s) were 
purely primary.   
 
We use control variables employed by An and Zhang (2013), Callen and Fang (2013, 2015), and Kim et al. 
(2011a, 2011b). Monetary variables are measured in millions of 2012 US dollars. As in Callen and Fang 
(2013, 2015), we winsorize all variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the influences of outliers. 
The baseline control variables are LN_MARKETCAPt, MBt, LEVERAGEt, ROEt, DTURNt, NCSKEWt, 
SIGMAt, and ALPHAt. LN_MARKETCAPt equals the natural log of the market value of common equity. MBt 
is the ratio of the market value of common stock to the book value of common stock. LEVERAGEt is the ratio 
of total debt to total assets. ROEt is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book value of 
common stock. DTURNt is the firm’s average monthly share turnover during fiscal year t minus the firm’s 
average monthly share turnover during fiscal year t-1, where monthly share turnover equals the number of 
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shares traded during the month divided by shares outstanding. This variable is a commonly used measure 
of differences of opinion among investors. NCSKEWt equals negative one multiplied by the skewness 
coefficient of the firm’s weekly firm-specific log-returns in year t. SIGMAt is the standard deviation of the 
firm’s weekly firm-specific log-returns during year t.  It is well known that SEOs tend to be preceded by 
unusually high stock returns. Since firms with high past returns have also been shown to exhibit greater 
negative return skewness (Chen et al., 2001), we consider it especially important to control for past stock 
return performance. ALPHAt, measures the firm’s idiosyncratic stock return performance and equals the 
natural log of one plus the estimated intercept from the firm’s five-factor model estimated during year t.  
 
Hutton et al. (2009) find that firms with abnormally high discretionary accruals, which can be used to 
manipulate reported earnings, are more likely to experience stock price crashes. Therefore, following Hutton 
et al. (2009) and Kim et al. (2011a), in some regressions we include the variable ACCRUALSt, which equals 
the sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals during years t, t-1, and t-2. Discretionary accruals are 
estimated using the Jones model originally proposed by Dechow et al. (1995). Kim et al. (2011a) find that tax 
avoidance is positively related to crash risk. Thus, in some regressions we include a variable that measures 
the firm’s long-run effective tax rate as constructed in Dyreng et al. (2008) and Kim et al. (2011a). Specifically, 
LRETRt is the ratio of total taxes paid during the past five years (years t-4 to t) to total pre-tax income net of 
special items during the same period. Our regressions that include ACCRUALSt and LRETRt have fewer 
observations than our baseline regressions because the Compustat data needed to construct these variables 
are missing for a significant number of firm-years in the sample.   
 
Callen and Fang (2013) and An and Zhang (2013) find that stable institutional ownership is associated with 
lower crash risk. As in Callen and Fang (2013), we measure the stability of institutional ownership using the 
variable STDIt, which was originally developed by Elyasiani et al. (2010). STDIt is defined as the average 
standard deviation of quarterly institutional shareholding proportions across all institutional investors in the 
firm over a 5-year period (year t-4 to year t). More formally, 








 is the proportion of firm i held by institutional investor j at quarter q (q = 1, 2, …, 20), and 𝐽𝑖 is the 
number of institutional investors in firm i. The twenty quarters used to compute this measure are those that 
comprise fiscal years t-4 through t. Smaller values of this variable indicate more stable institutional ownership.  
We test H1 in a multivariate setting using the following regression model:  





where for firm i in fiscal year t, CrashRiski,t+1,, is one of the previously defined measures of crash risk 
(CRASH or  NCSKEW), SEOi,t is the previously defined indicator variable capturing whether a firm completed 
an SEO in year t, and the control variables are previously described. We interpret a positive and statistically 
significant estimate of 𝛽 as evidence in favor of H1. As in Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim et al. (2011a, 2011b), 
when the dependent variable is CRASHt+1, we estimate a logistic regression that includes year dummies 
and industry dummies that correspond to the 49 Fama-French industry classifications. When the dependent 
variable is NCSKEWt+1, we use OLS with industry and year dummies. In all regressions, we adjust the 
standard errors for clustering by firm and year.  
 
We test H2 by augmenting the right-hand side of the regression equation above with the previously defined 
variable, SECONDARY_SEOt, which produces the following regression specification:  





In this case, the interpretation of the β coefficient is altered. β now captures the difference in crash risk 
between (i) firms that complete one or more SEOs without selling any secondary shares in year t and (ii) 
firms that do not complete an SEO in year t. The coefficient of interest in this case is γ, which captures the 
difference in crash risk between (i) firms that complete one or more SEOs that include secondary shares in 
year t and (ii) firm that complete one or more SEOs without selling any secondary shares in year t. H2 implies 





   Boehme et al. / International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, Vol 9 No 4, 2020 
  ISSN: 2147-4486 















In Table 3, we conduct univariate tests of H1 by comparing the proportion of firms with a crash in year t+1 
(CRASHt+1 = 1) across (i) firms that have at least one seasoned equity offering in year t (SEOt = 1) and (ii) 
firms that do not issue seasoned equity in year t (SEOt = 0). Among firms that do not issue seasoned equity, 
18.1% have a crash in the following year. In contrast, for firms that issue seasoned equity, the probability of 
crashing in the following year climbs to 24.2%, yielding a difference between the two subsamples of 6.1 
percentage points. This difference is significant (z-statistic = 11.48) and corresponds to a 34% (6.1/18.1) rise 
in the probability of crashing. Table 3 also reports mean and median values of NCSKEWt+1 across the two 
subsamples. The mean (median) value of NCSKEWt+1 is -0.192 (-0.184) for firms that do not issue seasoned 
equity in in year t and 0.050 (-0.009) for firms that do. The difference in means (and medians) is highly 
significant, indicating that recent equity issuers have returns that are more left skewed than non-issuers. 
These results provide support for H1.    
 
Table 3: SEOs and Crash Risk: Univariate Comparisons 
 Firms with an SEO in 
year t (SEOt = 1) 
Firms without 
an SEO in year 




# of Firm-Years 6,208 98,911  
Proportion with a crash in year t+1 (CRASHt+1 = 
1) 
24.2% 18.1% 12.03*** 
Mean NCSKEWt+1 0.050 -0.192 22.47*** 
Median NCSKEWt+1 -0.009 -0.184 22.48*** 
 
This table compares measures of one-year ahead crash risk across (i) firms that complete an SEO in year t 
and (ii) firms that do not complete an SEO in year t. We use a two-proportion z-test to test for significance of 
the difference in crash proportions across the two subsamples. We use a two-sample t test (Wilcoxon test) 
to test for statistical significance of the difference in mean (median) values of NCSKEWt+1. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in a two-tailed test. 
 
In Table 4, we test H1 with regressions that model one-year-ahead crash risk as a function of seasoned 
equity issuance (SEOt) and the previously described set of control variables. Models (1) and (2) in report the 
results of logistic regressions where CRASHt+1 is the dependent variable. The coefficient estimate for the 
indicator variable SEOt is positive and significant at the 1% level in both models, indicating that a crash in 
year t+1 is more likely to occur if the firm completed an SEO in year t. In specifications (3) and (4) of Table 
4, we perform OLS regressions using NCSKEWt+1 as the dependent variable. We continue to observe 
positive coefficients on SEOt that are statistically significant The results in Table 4 indicate that, relative to 
firms that have not recently issued equity, recent equity issuers are more likely to experience a stock price 
crash and have idiosyncratic returns that are more negatively skewed. Thus, our regression results in Table 
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Table 4: SEOs and Crash Risk: Multivariate Analysis 
Dependent Variable CRASHt+1   NCSKEWt+1 
   (1)  (2)    (3)   (4) 
SEOt 0.323*** 0.299***  0.161*** 0.161*** 
 (9.54) (6.67)  (11.91) (9.84) 
LN_MARKETCAPt 0.018 0.052***  0.059*** 0.066*** 
(0.96) (3.31)  (9.97) (12.50) 
MBt 
 
0.011*** 0.010***  0.006*** 0.006*** 
(4.69) (2.93)  (6.81) (5.39) 
LEVERAGEt 0.099** 0.103  0.006 -0.015 
(2.05) (1.45)  (0.36) (-0.54) 
ROEt 
 
0.014 0.001  0.014 0.001 
(0.55) (0.04)  (1.44) (0.07) 
DTURNt 0.524*** 0.592***  0.138** 0.146** 
 (3.34) (3.61)  (2.39) (2.42) 
NCSKEWt 0.142*** 0.120***  0.055*** 0.049*** 
 (9.21) (6.99)  (10.26) (6.90) 
SIGMAt -2.085*** -1.656**  0.049 0.192 
(-3.38) (-2.43)  (0.19) (0.77) 
ALPHAt 4.844*** 4.499***  2.670*** 3.562*** 
(4.88) (2.73)  (8.43) (6.13) 
LRETRt  -0.095***   -0.049*** 
 (-3.78)   (-4.38) 
ACCRUALSt  0.202***   0.045** 
 (3.24)   (2.50) 
STDIt  19.502***   8.707*** 
 (2.74)   (3.32) 
      R2 / Pseudo R2  0.019 0.021  0.048 0.049 
# of Firm-Years 105,119 58,446  105,119 58,446 
 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions that model crash risk in year t+1 as a function of 
whether the firm completed an SEO in year t and a set of controls. When the dependent variable is CRASHt+1  
(NCSKEWt+1) we use logistic (OLS) regression. All models include fiscal year and industry dummies 
(coefficients unreported). Z-statistics (t-statistics) based on standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm 
and year are reported in parentheses below logistic (OLS) coefficients. *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in two-tailed tests. 
 
In order to gauge the economic significance of SEOt’s ability to forecast the likelihood of a crash, we estimate 
marginal effects derived from the logistic regressions reported in Table 4 (models (1) and (2)). In a logistic 
regression, the marginal effect of an independent variable depends on the value of the given independent 
variable as well as the value of all other independent variables in the model. Since SEOt it is a dummy 
variable, we estimate its marginal effect as the change in crash probability that corresponds to a change from 
SEOt=0 to SEOt=1.  In addition, we estimate the marginal effect of SEOt while holding the values of the 
remaining independent variables at their sample means, which is common convention. In Table 4, SEOt has 
a marginal effect of 0.048 in model (1) and 0.047 in model (2). Based on the slightly more conservative 
estimate, the implication is that the completion of an SEO in year t is associated with a marginal increase in 
the probability of crashing in year t+1 of about 4.7 percentage points. Although slightly smaller, this 
multivariate estimate is comparable in magnitude to the univariate estimate of this effect (6.1 percentage 
points) reported in Table 3. Moreover, given that the conditional probability of a crash among non-issuers in 
our sample is 18.1% (Table 3), this result implies that a completed SEO in the prior year corresponds to a 
26% (4.7/18.1) increase in the risk of a crash and suggests that the association between seasoned equity 
offerings and stock price crashes is indeed economically meaningful. 
 
In Table 4, the coefficient estimates on the control variables are generally consistent with the findings of prior 
works. The variables LN_MARKETCAPt, MBt, DTURNt, NCSKEWt,  and ALPHAt have positive and 
significant coefficients in all or a majority of models in Table 4, which is in line with the findings of Chen et al. 
(2001), Kim et al. (2011a, 2011b), Hutton et al. (2009), Callen and Fang (2013, 2015), and An and Zhang 
(2013). The coefficients on LEVERAGEt, ROEt and SIGMAt exhibit inconsistencies in either their signs or 
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significance across the different models in Table 4. This is not altogether surprising, given that prior studies 
have reported mixed results regarding these three variables. LRETRt has a negative and significant 
coefficient across all specifications where it is included, indicating that firms with lower long-run effective tax 
rates have greater crash risk. This is consistent with the main findings of Kim et al. (2011a). In addition, 
ACCRUALSt has a significantly positive coefficient across all specifications where it is included, which 
indicates greater crash risk among firms with more discretionary accruals. This finding is in line with the 
empirical results of Hutton et al. (2009). Regarding the stability of institutional ownership, STDIt, possesses 
a positive and significant coefficient in all specifications in which it is included, which indicates greater crash 
risk among firms with less stable institutional ownership.  This result is in line with the conclusions of Callen 
and Fang (2013) and An and Zhang (2013).  
 
We conduct empirical tests of H2 with univariate comparisons of the crash risk measures across (i) firms that 
complete one or more SEOs without selling any secondary shares in year t (SEOt = 1, SECONDARY_SEOt 
= 0) and  (ii) firms that complete one or more SEOs that include secondary shares in year t (SEOt = 1, 
SECONDARY_SEOt = 1). Table 5 reports the results of these comparisons. As shown in the table, among 
firms that issue seasoned equity without selling any secondary shares in year t, 22.3% experience a crash 
in year t+1. In contrast, firms that complete one or more SEOs involving secondary shares in year t exhibit a 
significantly higher crash frequency, 27%, in year t+1. The difference of 4.7 percentage points is significant 
at the 1% level and represents a 21% (4.7/22.3) rise in the probability of crashing. Table 5 also compares 
mean and median values NCSKEWt+1 for the same two subsamples. The mean (median) values of 
NCSKEWt+1 are 0.006 (-0.037) for firms that issue seasoned equity without selling secondary shares and 
0.114 (0.036) form firms that sell secondary shares. The difference in means (medians) is highly significant, 
indicating that idiosyncratic returns of the latter group are more negatively skewed. Thus, the evidence from 
these univariate tests is consistent with H2. 
 
Table 5: Secondary SEOs and Crash Risk: Univariate Comparisons 
 Issuing firms that sell 
secondary shares in 
year t  (SEOt = 1, 
SECONDARY_SEOt 
= 1) 
Issuing firms that do not 
sell any secondary 





# of Firm-Years 2,522 3,686  
Proportion with a Crash in year t+1  
(CRASHt+1 = 1) 
27.0% 22.3% 4.25*** 
Mean NCSKEWt+1 0.114 0.006 5.05*** 
Median NCSKEWt+1 0.036 -0.037 5.22*** 
 
This table compares measures of crash risk in year t+1 across (i) firms that have at least one SEO that 
involves the sale of secondary shares in year t and (ii) firms with one or more SEOs in year t where none 
involve the sale of secondary shares. We use a two-proportion z-test to test for significance of the difference 
in crash proportions across the two subsamples. We use a two-sample t test (Wilcoxon test) to test for 
significance of the difference in mean (median) values of NCSKEWt+1. *, **, and *** denote significance of 
the difference at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in a two-tailed test. 
 
In Table 6, we test H2 in a multivariate setting by augmenting our regressions with the variable, 
SECONDARY_SEOt. As previously discussed, augmenting the regression equation with this variable alters 
the interpretation of the coefficient on SEOt. In this case, the coefficient on SEOt captures the difference in 
crash risk between firms that do not complete an SEO in year t and firms that complete one or more SEOs 
without selling any secondary shares in year t. For the purposes of testing H2, the coefficient of interest is 
that of SECONDARY_SEOt, which captures the difference in crash risk between issuing firms that sell 
secondary shares and issuing firms that do not sell secondary shares.    
 
In models (1) and (2) of Table 6, we perform logistic regressions with CRASHt+1 as the dependent variable. 
The coefficient on SEOt is positive and significant in both models, indicating that issuing firms that do not sell 
secondary shares are more likely to experience a crash than non-issuing firms. With respect to H2, the 
coefficient on SECONDARY_SEOt is positive and significant in both models (1) and (2). Thus, after 
controlling for other factors that predict crashes, we find that issuing firms that sell secondary shares are 
more likely to experience a crash relative to issuing firms that do not sell secondary shares. In Table 6, we 
run OLS regressions with NCSKEWt+1 as the dependent variable in models (3) and (4). We continue to 
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observe positive and significant coefficient estimates on both SEOt and SECONDARY_SEOt. Hence, the 
results in Table 6 pertaining to the latter variable are supportive of H2. 
 
Table 6: Secondary SEOs and Crash Risk: Multivariate Analysis 
Dependent Variable CRASHt+1   NCSKEWt+1 
   (1)  (2)    (3)   (4) 
SEOt 0.242*** 0.198***  0.135*** 0.134*** 
 (6.35) (3.38)  (11.53) (9.26) 
SECONDARY_SEOt 0.188*** 0.198***  0.063** 0.056** 
 (3.64) (2.91)  (2.54) (1.99) 
LN_MARKETCAPt 0.018 0.053***  0.059*** 0.066*** 
(0.97) (3.34)  (9.98) (12.51) 
MBt 
 
0.011*** 0.010***  0.006*** 0.006*** 
(4.60) (2.83)  (6.73) (5.36) 
LEVERAGEt 0.100** 0.108  0.007 -0.014 
(2.07) (1.50)  (0.39) (-0.50) 
ROEt 
 
0.012 -0.001  0.013 0.000 
(0.48) (-0.02)  (1.39) (0.01) 
DTURNt 0.522*** 0.588***  0.137** 0.145** 
 (3.31) (3.58)  (2.37) (2.39) 
NCSKEWt 0.142*** 0.120***  0.055*** 0.048*** 
 (9.21) (6.99)  (10.26) (6.89) 
SIGMAt -2.072*** -1.649**  0.052 0.194 
(-3.37) (-2.43)  (0.21) (0.78) 
ALPHAt 4.808*** 4.480***  2.660*** 3.557*** 
(4.85) (2.71)  (8.40) (6.12) 
LRETRt  -0.094***   -0.049*** 
 (-3.72)   (-4.34) 
ACCRUALSt  0.203***   0.046** 
 (3.28)   (2.52) 
STDIt  19.372***   8.672*** 
 (2.71)   (3.30) 
      R2 / Pseudo R2  0.019 0.021  0.048 0.049 
# of Firm-Years 105,119 58,446  105,119 58,446 
 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions that model crash risk in year t+1 as a function of 
whether the firm completed an SEO in year t, whether secondary shares were sold in the firm’s SEO(s), and 
a set of controls. When the dependent variable is CRASHt+1 (NCSKEWt+1) we use a logistic (OLS) 
regression. All models include fiscal year and industry dummies (coefficients unreported). Z-statistics (t-
statistics) based on standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses 
below logistic (OLS) coefficients. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively 
in two-tailed tests. 
 
In order to shed further light on the economic significance of the presence of secondary shares in SEOs, we 
estimate marginal effects of SECONDARY_SEOt derived from models (1) and (2) in Table 6. The marginal 
effect of this variable is defined as the change in crash probability that corresponds to a change from 
SECONDARY_SEOt=0 to SECONDARY_SEOt=1. As previously discussed, an estimate of the marginal 
effect of a given independent variable in a logistic regression depends on the values of the remaining 
independent variables. We follow convention and set the remaining independent variables to their sample 
means, with the exception of SEOt. Since our objective is to estimate the marginal difference in crash 
probability between issuing firms that do not sell secondary shares and issuing firms that do sell secondary 
shares, it is most appropriate to set the value of SEOt to one, since SEOt must equal one for both groups. 
Following this procedure, our estimates of the marginal effect of SECONDARY_SEOt from models (1) and 
(2) in Table 6 are 0.032 and 0.034, respectively. Based on the more conservative estimate, the implication 
is that the probability of a one-year-ahead crash is 3.2 percentage points higher for issuing firms that sell 
secondary shares relative to issuing firms that do not sell secondary shares.  Though this multivariate 
estimate is somewhat smaller than our univariate estimates of this effect (4.7 percentage points) from Table 
5, it is nonetheless economically meaningful.  
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For robustness, we examine whether the results from our tests in Tables 3 through 6 persist when we use 
the commonly used expanded market model to estimate firm-specific weekly returns as in Hutton et al. (2009) 
and Kim et al. (2011a, 2011b). Specifically, this return model includes the market factor (the weekly return 
on the CRSP value-weighted index) along with two weekly lags and two weekly leads of the market factor. 
The leads and lags are included to correct for potential biases in the loading coefficient caused by non-
synchronous trading (Dimson, 1979). In untabulated analyses, we estimate this model for each firm-year in 
the sample and use the residuals as the firm-specific returns. We compute our crash risk measures using 
these firm-specific returns and rerun all of our empirical tests. We find that our results remain robust.   
 
Boehme and May (2016) find that multinational firms with weak shareholder rights or a low percentage of 
independent directors on the board exhibit especially high crash risk. About 16% of the firm-years in our 
sample are included in the ISS Governance and ISS Directors databases. In untabulated analyses of this 
subsample, we examine whether our results persist when we include an indicator variable capturing whether 
the firm is multinational and its interactions with shareholder rights and the percentage of independent 
directors, as in Boehme and May (2016). We find that our results remain robust. We also examine whether 
the relation between crash risk and seasoned equity issuance depends on the strength of shareholder rights 
or board independence, but we find no evidence that it does. That is, the strong positive relation between 
seasoned equity issuance and crash risk persists across firms with both weak and strong shareholder rights 
and firms with both a low and high percentage of independent directors on the board.  
  
Graham et al. (2005) and Kothari et al. (2009) discuss factors that could incentivize managers to temporarily 
delay the release of positive news, including reputational concerns or expected costs of revealing proprietary 
information to competitors. If managers have a preference for issuing stock at high prices, we would expect 
incentives for good news hoarding to be especially low in the period before an equity offering. Hence, stock 
price jumps, i.e., extreme positive weekly returns, should be especially unlikely after an SEO, since the desire 
to issue equity at high prices would incent managers to disclose positive news in a timely manner prior to the 
offering. We examine this prediction in Table 7. We model the probability of a stock price jump as a function 
of equity issuance and the control variables used in our previous analysis of crash risk. As in Hutton et al. 
(2009), the dependent variable, JUMPt+1, equals one if the firm experiences a weekly firm-specific log-return 
that is 3.09 or more standard deviations above the firm’s mean in year t+1 and zero otherwise. As reported 
in Table 7, the coefficient on SEOt is negative and highly significant across all models, which is consistent 
with a lower likelihood of stock price jumps after SEOs. Taken together with our finding that firms exhibit 
unusually high crash risk after SEOs, our finding that stock price jumps are especially unlikely after SEOs is 
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Table 7: SEOs and Stock Price Jumps: Multivariate Analysis 
Dependent Variable: JUMPt+1    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
SEOt -0.340*** -0.346*** -0.323*** -0.350*** 
 (-10.30) (-7.42) (-7.60) (-6.34) 
SECONDARY_SEOt   -0.045 0.009 
   (-0.64) (0.12) 
Table 7- continuted 
Dependent Variable: JUMPt+1    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
LN_MARKETCAPt -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.189*** 
(-12.83) (-13.46) (-12.83) (-13.45) 
MBt 
 
-0.013*** -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.018*** 
(-5.68) (-5.38) (-5.64) (-5.41) 
LEVERAGEt 0.071 0.186** 0.071 0.186** 
(1.41) (2.58) (1.41) (2.57) 
ROEt 
 
-0.047*** -0.040 -0.047*** -0.040 
(-2.97) (-1.63) (-2.94) (-1.63) 
DTURNt -0.120 0.019 -0.119 0.019 
 (-1.01) (0.12) (-1.01) (0.12) 
NCSKEWt -0.083*** -0.079*** -0.083*** -0.079*** 
 (-8.82) (-5.95) (-8.81) (-5.94) 
SIGMAt -0.870** -1.521** -0.871** -1.521** 
(-1.99) (-2.31) (-1.99) (-2.31) 
ALPHAt -5.317*** -7.577*** -5.311*** -7.578*** 
(-6.97) (-5.40) (-6.98) (-5.41) 
LRETRt  0.044  0.044 
 (1.21)  (1.21) 
ACCRUALSt  -0.025  -0.025 
 (-0.53)  (-0.53) 
STDIt  -13.184**  -13.189** 
 (-2.56)  (-2.56) 
     Pseudo R2 0.0335 0.0316 0.0335 0.0316 
# of Firm-Years 105,119 58,446 105,119 58,446 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from logistic regressions that model the probability of a stock price 
jump in year t+1 as a function of seasoned equity issuance in year t and a set of control variables. All models 
include fiscal year and industry dummies (coefficients unreported). Z-statistics based on standard errors 
adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in two-tailed tests. 
 
Conclusions 
In a large panel of U.S. firms during 1987–2011, we find robust evidence that the issuance of seasoned 
equity is a reliable predictor of future stock price crash risk. Our findings are robust to alternative measures 
of crash risk, including the skewness of firm-specific returns, as well as controlling for known predictors of 
crash risk identified in prior studies. The association between seasoned equity offerings and crash risk is 
even stronger among offerings that involve the sale of secondary shares. Our results are consistent with a 
propensity for bad news hoarding among issuing firms and especially among firms that sell secondary 
shares. We also find that recent seasoned equity issuers are far less likely to experience sudden positive 
price jumps relative to firms that have not recently issued equity, which, when taken together with our finding 
of greater crash risk, suggests a propensity for managers of issuing firms to hoard bad but not good news. 
  
Our paper makes several important contributions. We further advance the scholarly literature aimed at 
understanding and modeling extreme outcomes in financial markets and, in particular, the growing literature 
focused on understanding the precursors to firm-level crashes. Given that several studies suggest 
theoretically or empirically that investors are concerned with tail risk in the returns of individual stocks (Conrad 
et al., 2013; Huang et al., 2012; Boyer et al., 2010; Barberis and Huang, 2008; Brunnermeier et al., 2007; 
Mitton and Vorkink, 2007), our findings should be especially useful to practitioners and market participants 
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interested in modeling firm-specific crash risk. Finally, our paper offers new insights into the distributional 
properties of stock returns after equity issues that cannot be gleaned from existing studies. Numerous 
empirical works have attempted to determine whether equity issuers earn post-issue returns that are, on 
average, lower than those of non-issuers, with mixed results across different studies and considerable 
disagreement persisting among scholars. The near exclusive focus on the first moment of the return 
distribution in prior works leaves unexplored other important distributional characteristics that should be of 
interest to market participants and scholars. We offer a new perspective that elucidates the presence of fat 
left tails in the distribution of firm-specific returns after seasoned equity offerings. Thus, in addition to 
informing scholars interested in understanding the determinants of firm-specific crash risk, our findings 
should also be of notable importance to scholars interested in better understanding stock price dynamics 
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